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This paper presents the advantages of taking into account the distribution of the 
individual wage gap when analyzing female wage discrimination. The limitations 
of previous approaches such as the classic Oaxaca-Blinder and the recent 
distributive proposals using quantile regressions or counterfactual functions are 
thoroughly discussed. The new methodology presented here relies on Jenkins' 
(1994) work and proposes the use of poverty and deprivation literature 
techniques that are directly applicable to the measurement of discrimination. In 
an empirical application, we quantify the relevance of the glass ceiling and sticky 
floor phenomena in the Spanish labor market. 
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The lower wages paid to female workers in comparison with males can easily be 
checked empirically in most labor markets. The fact that these wage differentials are not 
justified in terms of labor productivity is usually known as gender wage discrimination. 
In spite of the increasing interest on these matters since the classical works of Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973), not much is yet known about how this phenomenon affects 
the different subgroups of female workers. 
 
Very recent lines of research aim to include distributional aspects in the study of gender 
discrimination. Some of them propose the use of quantile regressions in the estimation 
of wage equations in order to increase the number of points in the earnings distribution 
at which the wage gap is evaluated (for example García, Hernández and López-Nicolás 
(2001) and Gardeazábal and Ugidos (2005) among others). Other proposals include a 
variety of techniques to estimate counterfactual earnings distribution functions in order 
to compare them with the original wage distribution and quantify the effects of wage 
differentials throughout the whole earnings range (see Fortin and Lemieux (1998) and 
Bonjour and Gerfin (2001)). Certainly both approaches allow us to obtain more 
information from the observed wage distributions than the classical methodology. 
Nevertheless, both avoid considering the individual dimension of discrimination, i.e. 
each individual’s discrimination experience. 
 
This was addressed by Jenkins (1994), who underlined the need to consider the 
following two issues in any analysis of wage discrimination: 1) how to identify which 
individuals suffer discrimination and in what quantity; and 2) how to sum up the wage 
gaps using an index that verifies a set of desirable normative properties. He proposed to 
analyze the distribution of individual wage gaps using the theoretical advances in 
poverty research. Indeed, poverty and discrimination have strong similarities. More 
precisely, both imply some income or wage gap: either individual income does not 
provide a minimum level of resources (Atkinson, 1998), or similarly, the female wage is 
below what she would receive if she was male but otherwise had identical attributes. 
From this perspective, the wage gap reveals itself as genuinely individual, implying that 
its distribution should play a crucial role when quantifying the aggregate level of 
discrimination. 
   2
Discrimination  analysis should focus on the definition of indicators that summarize 
individual wage gaps by using weights that take into account the different 
discriminatory experiences of female workers. The classical methodology, widely used 
in empirical work, limits the analysis to the calculation of the mean wage gap. This 
implicitly means estimating all the individual wage gaps and aggregating them, 
attaching the same weight to each gap, independent of its relative relevance or value 
within the wage distribution. This does not seem a good idea from a distributive point of 
view, since the aggregation process includes value judgments in an obscure way. The 
aim of this paper is to propose a normative framework for the study of wage 
discrimination based on the literature on poverty and deprivation, which provides us 
with indicators that are explicit in incorporating the necessary judgments about how to 
aggregate wage gaps. These indices will permit the ranking of a list of women’s 
earnings’ distributions in terms of their discrimination level and the comparison of the 
discriminatory experiences of women with different personal characteristics (education, 
occupation, marital status, wage, age, etc.). In doing so, we rely on previous works by 
Jenkins (1994) and Shorrocks (1998).  
 
 Our contribution is fourfold. First, we examine the limitations of recent distributional 
approaches for the analysis of wage discrimination. Second, we discuss the normative 
properties that any discrimination measure should satisfy when aggregating individual 
wage gaps, and we suggest a minimal set of them on which to reach a wide agreement. 
Next, we propose different discrimination measures, taken from the poverty literature, 
that are consistent with the above properties. These measures allow us to quantify both 
absolute and relative (with respect to different reference wages) discrimination. Third, 
unlike Jenkins (1994), we propose the use of quantile regressions to identify and 
estimate individual wage gaps. It is shown that the estimation of wage equations by 
means of quantile regressions and the use of normative measures of discrimination á la 
Jenkins are not exclusive but complementary techniques.
1 Fourth, in order to provide 
empirical evidence on the theoretical contribution of the paper, we contrast the 
advantages of our approach using data from a Spanish survey on wages. This last 
exercise allows us to identify those subgroups of female workers who suffer the highest 
discrimination levels. We show not only the existence of glass ceilings and sticky floors   3
in the Spanish labor market, but we also quantify the contribution of each of them to 
total discrimination.
2 We should underline that, even if we recurrently refer to gender 
wage discrimination, the contributions of this paper are readily applicable to any other 
source of discrimination such as race, sexual orientation, nationality, age, religion, 
citizenship, etc.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the classic approach to the 
measurement of discrimination and gives a sound justification of the importance of 
considering distributive aspects in discrimination measurement. In Section 2 we discuss 
the limitations of a variety of distributional techniques recently used in the 
measurement of wage discrimination. Section 3 presents our theoretical proposal 
detailing its main contributions. Section 4 provides two alternative empirical 
procedures to estimate individual wage gaps. In Section 5, we provide empirical 
evidence on the advantages of our techniques on a sample of Spanish wages micro-
data. Finally, Section 6 concludes by presenting our main findings.  
 
1. THE RELEVANCE OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE APPROACH IN ANALYSING 
WAGE DISCRIMINATION  
 
1.1 Wage discrimination: The identification problem 
 
Usually, gender wage discrimination is identified as the difference in earnings between 
male and female workers who are otherwise identical in their attributes and thus in their 
expected productivity. In order to detect its presence and to measure its relevance, 
researchers have traditionally estimated wage equations conditional on a list of variables 
which, a priori, are potential determinants of the individual’s salary.  
 
Thus, two separated mincerian log wage equations for males and females are commonly 
estimated:
  
                                                                                                                             
1 Note that the counterfactual functions approach does not identify the discriminated female workers and 
does not provide us with individualized wage gaps. In that case Jenkins’s analysis becomes impossible. 
2 Usually, the literature has identified the existence of a glass ceiling when the gender pay gap is 
significantly larger at the top of the wage distribution. In contrast, Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan 
(2004), after Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2003), identified as a sticky floor when the gender wage gap 
is significantly larger at the bottom of the wage distribution.  
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where m refers to males, f  to females, yi stands for the i
th worker hourly wage,  i ω  is the 
natural logarithm of yi, Z’i is the vector of characteristics, β  are the characteristics’ 
rates of return, and ui is the corresponding error term.
3  
 
1.2 Wage discrimination: The aggregation problem 
 
Traditionally based on OLS estimations of these wage equations, discrimination has 
been evaluated in the mean distribution of the characteristics, and has thus quantified 
the wage discrimination suffered by the mean female worker when compared to the 
mean  male worker. This is precisely the approach proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973) in their seminal articles and which has been recurrently utilized in the 
literature ever since. In the original Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the mean observed 
wage gap is divided into two components: a first component, A, would quantify the 
labor market premium on the mean differences in characteristics between genders, while 
the second component, B, would show how differently the labor market rewards 
workers with a different gender evaluated at the mean female characteristics:  
 
.    B   A       ) ˆ - ˆ ( ˆ ) Z - Z (   ) ln( - ) ln(
' ' ' + = + = f m f m f m f m Z y y β β β  
 
Graph 1 shows, in the one-dimensional case, that the second component denotes the 
wage penalty the mean female worker faces given that she has a different remuneration 
of attributes compared to males.
4 Even if seldom noted, it is easy to check that B is the 
mean of the individual differences between predicted male and female log wages 
                                           
3 In his classic survey Cain (1986) offers a detailed reference to the most important theories that attempt 
to explain discrimination and discusses models based on Mincer (1974). Recently, in Kunze (2000) we 
find a revision of the most relevant empirical literature in trying to achieve a consistent estimation of the 
parameters in wage equations. 
4 In Graph 1 the mean female and male worker is  f Z  and  m Z , respectively, and different individual 
female workers in the population are associated with Zf1, Zf2, Zf3 and Zf4.   5
estimated for each woman in the population.
5 The choice of the male wage structure as 
the non-discriminatory reference is equivalent to considering discrimination as the 
disadvantage of any group with respect to the most favored group. This would not be 
















Whatever the non-discriminatory remuneration structure of reference, the use of the 
wage distribution mean is a large waste of information. In the first place, the mean does 
not allow for differences in the discriminatory experience at different points of the wage 
distribution. Furthermore, and most importantly, it implies assuming that to give the 
same weight to each different individual discrimination experience is a desirable way of 
aggregating wage gaps, independently of the actual degree of discrimination suffered by 
each individual. This all imposes, implicitly and in an obscure way, value judgments 
that are rather implausible from a normative point of view. There has been little, if any, 
discussion in the literature on the adequacy of these assumptions. Most probably this 
                                           
5 Thus,  ( ) n Z Z B
i
f f m f i i / ˆ    - ˆ ∑ = β β , being n the total number of female workers. Notice that if there are 
women enjoying negative wage gaps,  f f m f i i Z Z β β ˆ    ˆ < , positive and negative gaps would offset each other 
in B.  
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Graph 1. Wage discrimination using OLS   6
has been due to the attractive mathematical properties of the mean and also to the 
general lack of discussion of normative implications in discrimination measurement.
6  
 
2. THE LIMITATIONS OF RECENT DISTRIBUTIVE APPROACHES  
 
Recently, a number of papers have introduced a variety of econometric techniques in 
order to incorporate distributive aspects in the comparative analysis of wage 
distribution. Since the Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991, 1993) seminal papers,
7 a large 
list of works have suggested that the market remuneration to individual endowments is 
not constant along the wage range. Buchinsky (1994) presented empirical evidence 
using quantile regressions in the study of the evolution of wages in the US. Di Nardo, 
Fortin and Lemieux (1996) quantified the effects generated by the change in the 
distribution of workers’ characteristics on wage density using non-parametric regression 
techniques to estimate counterfactual wage distributions (which permited them to 
combine one period’s population attributes with the returns structure of another). More 
recently, in their analysis of Portuguese wage inequality, Machado and Mata (2001) 
used quantile regressions to model the conditional wage distribution on workers’ 
characteristics allowing for the measurement of different returns for each attibute at 
different points of the wage range. 
 
Within the studies that aim to measure gender wage discrimination, Blau and Khan 
(1996, 1997) explained the international differences in female wage deficiency and their 
evolution in time using the methodology proposed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991).
8 
Fortin and Lemieux (1998) decomposed at various wage percentiles changes in the US 
gender gap using rank regressions. Bonjour and Gerfin (2001) applied the methodology 
proposed by Donald, Green and Paarsch (2000) to decompose the wage gap in 
Switzerland. Most recently, other papers have used quantile regressions in order to 
decompose the gender wage gap at different points of the wage distribution. Examples 
of this are Reilly (1999) and Newell and Reilly (2001) in the analysis of ex-communist 
                                           
6 In this context, we agree with Jenkins (1994) in defending that the study of discrimination should aim to 
rely on measurements that allow us to identify the differences in results when we incorporate, explicitly, 
different judgments in the aggregation of individual information. 
7 These authors use OLS regressions in providing alternative disaggregation of the estimated and 
counterfactual wage differences for different time periods. 
8 This methodology allowed them to take into account the role played by the wage structure in the 
explanation of the gender wage gap.    7
countries in transition, Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman (2003) in their study of the 
glass-ceiling in Sweden, Albrecht, Van Vuuren and Vroman (2004) in their work for the 
Netherlands,
9 García, Hernández and López-Nicolás (2001), Gardeazábal and Ugidos 
(2005), and De la Rica, Dolado and Llorens (2005) in their works for Spain,
10 and 




We maintain that all these recent approaches to the analysis of discriminatory practices 
are a clear improvement on other previous ones but present, nevertheless, some 
important limitations in measuring discrimination from a distributive point of view. In 
some cases, problems arise from the conceptual confusion of the distributive aspects of 
measurement with the distributive effects of discrimination. Also, the fact that all the 
procedures proposed try to avoid incorporating value judgements in the aggregation of 
the different discriminatory experiences, under a normative shelter, make much more 
difficult any comparison on the matter.  Given the interest on both issues: distributive 
aspects and value judgements in the aggregation of the gaps, we should pay special 
attention to the arguments that sustain them. 
 
2.1 The comparison of conditional wage distributions: distributive aspects and 
conceptual errors in measuring discrimination  
 
In order to provide an illustration of the problems that arise when using counterfactual 
distribution functions in the estimation of wage discrimination, suppose that we know 
that the female wage distribution without discrimination is rf and we compare it with the 
observed female wage distribution yf. When moving from yf to rf, it will not come as a 
                                           
9 In both cases, authors use techniques developed by Machado and Mata (2005) where quantile 
regressions are used in order to estimate counterfactual density functions. 
10 In García, Hernández and López-Nicolás (2001) female wage discrimination in the Spanish labour 
market increases along the wage range both in absolute and in relative terms (in relation to the total wage 
gap). These authors use instrumental variables in order to endogenise education and other econometric 
techniques that allow us to avoid a selection bias. In contrast, Gardeazábal and Ugidos (2005) obtain that 
relative female wage discrimination in Spain decreases as wages increase. Here authors estimate the 
discrimination at each quantile using the “corresponding” quantile characteristics and not mean 
population characteristics, as García, Hernández and López-Nicolás (2001) did. De la Rica, Dolado and 
Llorens (2005), instead, used (even if partially) Albrecht, Björklund y Vroman (2003) proposal and 
identify the highest wage discrimination levels for Spain in the last deciles of the female wage 
distribution for those women with a high level of education.  
11 Other recent works that have tackled distributive issues from significantly more simple methodologies 
are, inter alia, Gerry, Kim and Li (2004), Méndez and Hernández (2001) and Vartiainen (2002).   8
surprise that some female workers change their relative positions. This could imply that 
the earnings differentials between both distributions, evaluated at each quantile, would 
not show the true differences in discriminatory experiences of female workers. Let us 
show an example: Suppose that we depart from such a wage distribution as the density 
function f(yf) on the left hand side of Graph 2 and, once we eliminate direct wage 
discrimination, the new density function moves uniformly to the right, f(rf). In this 
particular case, the distributive analysis using quantile differences would conclude that 





Nevertheless, this may not be necessarily true. It may be the case, as depicted in the 
graph, that all type A women, who initially earned yA, earn rA when the discriminatory 
component is eliminated. Additionally, a similar number of those female workers who 
were earning yB could be experiencing a lower wage change once we eliminate 
discrimination and thus appear in rB. The rest of type B women would reach the same 
wage level as females in A, the level r’B = rA. Obviously, the level of discrimination 
suffered by group A is much larger than that suffered by group B, but neither the study 
of the differences in the mean nor the comparison of quantile counterfactual 
distributions would detect it. In other words, when comparing density functions we are 
not only quantifying discrimination but also the re-orderings in the wage distribution. In 
B 
A 





Graph 2. Wage discrimination using counterfactual densities   9
this way, this measurement of discrimination is contaminated in the presence of 
mobility between quantiles.  
 
The comparison of the mean, the variance or quantiles of the wage distribution 
functions does not allow us to consider the individual discriminatory experience. This 
strategy makes it impossible to assure that a certain decile suffers more or less 
discrimination than another, given that the women who were initially placed in each of 
them may not be the same women once individual discrimination is taken into account. 
Nevertheless various techniques in the literature on gender wage discrimination are 
based implicitly on the assumption that these are the same women. Clearly, these papers 
should observe caution in the interpretation of some of their results.
12 The use of these 
techniques should remain within the interesting study of the distributive effects of 
discrimination. However, these effects should not be understood as levels of 
discrimination at different points of wage distribution.
13 
 
2.2 The need for normative measures of wage discrimination 
 
It is important to be aware that neither the methodologies based on conditional wage 
distribution functions nor those using quantile regressions consider how to weight the 
different levels of discrimination estimated throughout the wage range. Implicitly, they 
avoid the construction of a single aggregated indicator. This decision may be argued as 
adequate in the aim of incorporating the least number of value judgments possible in 
the analysis.
14 To provide measurements of discrimination at different quantiles without 
any aggregation criterion implies solving the judgments issue in a trivial way: no 
aggregation is undertaken and therefore no value judgments are incorporated. We 
should be aware, however, that this strategy makes it rather difficult to compare 
discrimination levels between distributions (apart from the trivial case in which a given 
wage distribution presents more discrimination in all estimated quantiles).  
 
                                           
12 Some recent works that suffer from this problem within the literature of gender wage discrimination are 
Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman (2003) and Bonjour and Gerfin (2001).    
13 The decomposition of wage discrimination using quantile regressions does not suffer from this 
problem. This technique quantifies the level of discrimination experienced by females situated at different 
wage quantiles, but it does not evaluate the wage difference between them and those that occupy the same 
position in the non-discriminatory distribution.  
14 As it was maintained by Gardeazábal and Ugidos (2005) in their introductory section.   10
We argue here that in the distribution literature there are valuable options that 
incorporate judgments in a very reasonable way. The Lorenz dominance criterion 
aggregates income levels in order to compare different income distributions in terms of 
inequality under a minimum number of value judgments on which there has been an 
agreement.
15 This adds robustness, but incompleteness, to the orderings. In those cases 
in which the Lorenz criterion cannot order functions, complete inequality indices (Gini, 
Theil or Atkinson index) are unavoidable. The latter incorporate a larger number of 
value judgments than the Lorenz criterion but allow us to undertake slightly more 
delicate orderings. Often, the results offered by complete indices do not coincide, but 
differences between them are not at all random but consistent with their particular 
normative properties. A deep analysis of these permits us the best comprehension of the 
analyzed phenomenon.  
 
Jenkins' (1994) approach
  advances in this direction and proposes discrimination 
measures that allow for the aggregation of wage gaps.
16 Our proposal extends his 
approach incorporating some improvements. We propose a normative framework in 
which to insert a discrimination measurement following the literature on deprivation.  
 
3. NORMATIVE DISCRIMINATION MEASURES 
 
So far we have shown that, firstly, when analyzing discrimination we should focus on 
the “experience of each individual.” Given the bi-dimensional nature of this 
information, summarized by  )   , (
i i f f r y , any measure that tries to quantify it should be 
written as a function of  ) (
i i f f y r − , rather than as a function of 
i f r  and 
i f y  taken 
separately. Secondly, we need to aggregate these individual experiences. This implies 
                                           
15 Basically resumed in two axioms: symmetry (or anonymity) and the Pigou-Dalton Principle of 
Transfers. 
16 A number of papers have used the indices just as proposed by Jenkins (1994). We know of the 
empirical works of Makepeace, Paci, Joshi and Dolton (1998), Denny, Harmon and Roche (2000), 
Gustafsson and Li (2000), Hansen and Wahlberg (2001) and Ullibarri (2003). In Favaro y Magrini 
(2003), differently from the rest, we find some criticisms to Jenkins’ approach and authors propose the 
estimation of bivariant density functions as an alternative. In our opinion this is not an alternative to 
Jenkins’ techniques but a useful descriptive tool previous to the deeper distributive analysis of 
discrimination we present here. It is true, however, that this could be complemented with some index 
which aggregates wage changes experienced by females (for example an index based on transition 
matrices). In doing this we incorporate ad hoc value judgements associated with the index’s aggregation 
properties in an obscure way.    11
taking value judgments into account, and these are, necessarily, of a subjective nature. 
Is this a problem? Not if we accept that discrimination is a bad thing in the same way 
that poverty or the duration of unemployment are. Hence the question is: what 
properties should a measure of discrimination satisfy? The literature on economic 
poverty has widely accepted a list of normative properties as satisfactory requirements 
for any poverty measure. We believe that these same properties are also adequate in the 
case of the study of wage discrimination. Let us discuss our proposal in detail.   
 
3.1 Normative properties of discrimination indices 
 
Consider two vectors of individual wage gaps, xf and x’f, where  f x = 
)   ....,   , (
1 1 n n f f f f y r y r − − , and  f x' =  )   ....,   , (
' ' ' '
1 1 s s f f f f y r y r − − , being 
i f y  and 
i f r  female wages 
with and without discrimination, and being n and s respectively the total number of 
female workers in each distribution. d(xf) represents the level of discrimination, which 
corresponds to distribution xf for a given measure d. The minimal set of normative 
properties or axioms that d(.) should satisfy are the following:  
 
1)  Continuity Axiom. d(xf) must be a continuous function for any vector of wage 
gaps in its domain, xf. 
 
2)  Focus Axiom. If we can obtain x’f from xf by rises in wages of non-discriminated 
women, then d(x’f) = d(xf). 
 
3)  Symmetry (or Anonymity) Axiom. If x’f can be obtained from xf by a finite 
sequence of permutations of individual wage gaps, then d(x’f) = d(xf). 
 
4)  Replication Invariance Axiom. If we can obtain x’f from xf by replications of the 
population, then d(x’f) = d(xf). 
 
5)  (Weak) Monotonicity Axiom. If x’f can be obtained from xf by increasing the 
discrimination level of a woman, then d(x’f) > d(xf). 
   12
6)  (Weak) Transfer Axiom. If we can obtain x’f from xf by a sequence of 
“regressive transfers” between two discriminated female workers, so that the one 
with the highest discrimination suffers an increase in her wage gap equal to the 
decrease experienced by the other, then d(x’f) > d(xf). 
 
The Continuity Axiom is a reasonable property for any index in order to guarantee that 
small changes in wage gaps do not lead to large changes in discrimination levels. The 
Symmetry Axiom guarantees that the index does not favor any particular woman, and the 
Replication Invariance Axiom is a technical property that allows for comparisons 
between distributions of different size. The two other final axioms lead to two basic 
properties. The Monotonicity Axiom refers to discrimination intensity, so that a 
worsening in the position of a discriminated woman yields a higher level of aggregate 
discrimination. The Transfer Axiom implies that a higher inequality level between 
discriminated women, in terms of their discrimination sharing, leads to an increase in 
the discrimination index. 
 
Finally, the Focus Axiom requires the index to be dependent on the distribution of 
discriminated women while disregarding the wage level of the rest of the female 
workers. This does not mean that measures verifying this axiom are necessarily 
independent of the existence of women with wage advantages with respect to male 
workers,
17 but it does require that these salary advantages are not taken into account 
when measuring aggregate discrimination. We consider this axiom essential in order to 
properly aggregate individual discrimination. Suppose hypothetically that we find a 
labor market in which 40 percent of females suffer from a $100 wage discrimination 
while another 40 percent earn a $100 more than their equivalent males. An index that 
compensates these differences would measure the same discrimination in this labor 
market than in one in which all females earn exactly the same as identical males.
18 We 
consider these two situations as clearly different because we believe that discrimination 
is a form of individual (rather than group) deprivation, just like poverty or 
unemployment are. In all those cases, it is straightforward that an individual’s 
                                           
17 In fact, the share of these women over total female workers will be taken into account in all indices that 
verify  continuity,  monotonicity and replication invariance axioms (see Zheng (1997) for the poverty 
case). Other things equal, the larger the share of discriminated women the larger discrimination will be. 
18 This is the case in the measurement of discrimination using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.   13
deprivation situation cannot be counterbalanced by the lack of deprivation of others.
19 
The advantage of our approach is that it provides tools in order to aggregate individual 
discrimination using an index with reasonable normative properties. Further, it provides 
a framework to fully characterize discriminated individuals in a society given that it 
could be the case that some types of discrimination only appear in certain occupations 
or sectors and not in others.
 This definitely helps us in deepening the knowledge about 
discrimination in all possible settings.
20 
 
Accepting the axioms above, we will be able both to construct discrimination profiles 
by accumulating individual wage gaps and to develop some dominance criteria to rank 
wage distributions according to their discrimination level. Next we will be able to make 
a correspondence between these  rankings and those obtained by using complete 
discrimination indices that also satisfy these properties. This is the case in the inequality 
and poverty fields, where there are valuable theorems that establish a relationship 
between the income distribution ranking obtained by Lorenz or TIP’s dominance 
criteria and those obtained by complete inequality and poverty indices compatible with 
those criteria. Thus, by using a minimal set of judgments, summarized in the above 
properties, we will be able to identify particular empirical cases where the 
discrimination distribution ranking is independent of the index chosen, since all indices 
yield the same result. This makes our analysis of discrimination significantly more 
robust. 
 
This line of research was opened by Jenkins (1994) when he used the Inverse 
Generalized Lorenz Curve (IGLC) in the discrimination field, and defined 
discrimination indices consistent with its dominance criterion.
21 Later, in the 
deprivation field, Shorrocks (1998) generalized these relationships in the continuous 
                                           
19 This is similar to considering that the existence of famous Gypsy musicians or African-American 
athletes should not offset the inferior economic position of most individuals from their ethnic or racial 
group. 
20 Note that our approach allows also for the analysis and characterization of non-discriminated women. 
Alternatively, one could address the analysis of male discrimination using female wage structure as a 
reference although, presumably, it would be rather small given that only a minority of men, if any, would 
appear to be discriminated. 
21 This curve represents the per capita cumulative sum of wage gaps, on absolute values, for each 
cumulative proportion of women, once they have been ranked from higher to lower absolute wage gap. 
Note that Jenkins (1994), when defining the IGLC on absolute values of xf, does not impose the focus 
axiom. However, as it has been shown, it seems reasonable to redefine the variable, the dominance 
criterion and the indices he proposes taking that axiom into account.    14
case and summarized previous results obtained by different authors in the deprivation 
field.
22 In what follows, we extend this analysis and propose the use of Discrimination 
Curves and discrimination indices that will be defined so as to satisfy the above axioms. 
 
3.2 Dominance relations between Discrimination Curves 
 
Let us define  ) ( f x g  to be the vector of individual wage discrimination, which 
corresponds to the vector of individual wage gaps,  )   ....,   ,   , (







⎧ − =   0   ), (     max   ) (
i i f f f y r x gi  
 
The Discrimination Curve represents for each  1 0 ≤ ≤ p  the sum of the first 100*p 
percent of  ) ( f x i g  values divided by the total number of female workers, n, once these 
have been ranked from a higher to a lower wage discrimination level. Hence, 
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where k is any integer number such that  n k ≤ .
23 The Discrimination Curve is the 
IGLC defined for ) ( f x g rather than for absolute values of wage gaps, |xf |, as in Jenkins 
(1994). The latter implies, counter-intuitively, considering positive and negative wage 
gaps as equivalent. 
 
                                           
22 These results are derived from works by Spencer and Fisher (1992), and their “absolute rotated Lorenz 
curve”, and from Jenkins and Lambert (1997, 1998) and their TIP (“Three ‘I’s of Poverty”) curves in the 
analysis of poverty. Jenkins (1994) refers to the “inverse generalised Lorenz curve” in the analysis of 
discrimination, while Shorrocks (1993) applied that approach to the unemployment duration profiles. 
Also, Blanke and Shorrocks (1994) use this approach to study the length of time spent in poverty. 
23 In the continuous case we would consider a measure of individual wage discrimination, given by 
variable u, distributed in the female population as the distribution function F. Afterwards, and following 
Shorrocks (1998), we would define the discrimination curve D(F;·) as: 
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D(g) accumulates individual discrimination levels, from higher to lower discrimination, 
divided by n. As shown in Graph 3,
24  D(g) is a positive, increasing and concave 
function; where D0(g)=0, D1(g)= g , and takes a constant value when we consider the 
last discriminated woman, k
*. The shape of the above curve provides us with useful 
information. First, it shows the incidence of discrimination so that to identify the 
proportion of discriminated women, we only need to know the percentile where the 
curve becomes a horizontal line, h=k*/n. Second, it informs us about its intensity, since 
the height of the curve is the accumulated discrimination averaged by the number of 
female workers. Third, it also shows the inequality aspect of the discrimination 








Definition of dominance in discrimination.  Given two wage discrimination 
distributions, g
1 y g
2, we would say that: 
 
                                           
24 This is an adaptation of Figure 1 in Jenkins and Lambert (1997), where the properties of the TIP curves 
are shown to measure aggregate poverty. 
25 Note that if all discriminated women suffered the same absolute discrimination level, the first part of 
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Graph 3. Discrimination Curve   16
g
1 dominates g 
2  in a discriminatory sense if 
2 1 g g ≠   and   ) ( ) (
2 1 g D g D p p ≤  for any  [ ] 1   , 0 ∈ p  
 
It is straightforward then to show that this dominance criterion is closely linked to the 
six properties mentioned above: the continuity axiom (small changes in g yield small 
changes in the curve); the focus axiom (the curve becomes horizontal when the first 
non-discriminated woman is included in the calculation of the cumulative share, so that 
the wage advantage of these women is not taken into account); the symmetry axiom 
(since the only aspect of female workers considered is their discrimination level, which 
makes impossible to identify them); the replication axiom (the curve does not change 
when the initial population has been replicated); the monotonicity axiom (the curve 
turns upwards when the discrimination level of any woman increases); and the transfer 
axiom (the curve increases its degree of concavity when the discrimination is more 
unevenly distributed while the average discrimination level is kept unchanged).  
 
Thus, we can establish a relationship between dominance in the discriminatory sense 
and the set of aggregate indices, d
*(xf), that satisfy in g(xf) the continuity,  focus, 




For any pair of wage discrimination distributions, g
1 and g
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Hence, a higher discrimination curve leads, unambiguously, to a higher discrimination 
level for an extensive set of discrimination indices.
 Notice that this theoretical result 
also makes it possible to quantify the differences in discrimination between two wage 
                                           
26 This result was first shown in Shorrocks (1993), where it was used to study the duration of 
unemployment, and in Jenkins and Lambert (1993) in the poverty field. This work established the basis 
for later results on TIP curves (Jenkins and Lambert (1997, 1998)). The continuous case is shown in 
Shorrocks (1998). Jenkins (1994) first used this approach in the wage discrimination field, where he   17
distributions without using complete indices. This stems from Theorems 4 and 5 in 
Jenkins and Lambert (1998). Let us consider, for example, that wage distribution B has 
a higher discrimination level than A. In this case, it can be helpful to increase observed 
wages,  f y , in distribution B, by multiplying them by a number higher than 1, while 
keeping  f r  constant. This entails decreasing individual wage gaps proportionally, so 
that later we can check if the initial relationship of dominance still holds. If it holds, we 
could repeat the exercise to determine the larger interval (written in terms of wages in 
distribution B) where distribution A has lower discrimination levels. In this way we can 
study how robust and intense is our initial result even without using complete 
discrimination indices. 
 
3.3 Complete indices consistent with dominance discrimination 
 
Since the dominance criterion is not always able to give us conclusive results in 
empirical applications (the estimated discrimination curves can cross) it is interesting to 
explore some of the indices belonging to d
*. We are interested in those that satisfy both 
the normative axioms above and any other property that may be of special interest for 
empirical analysis, such as decomposability.  
 
Additive Decomposability. Consider a partition within xf, where n1
 + n2
 + ...+ nJ
 = n are 
the sizes of J subpopulations, xf
(1), xf
(2), ..., xf
(J). A discrimination index d is said to be 
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This property suggests that it may be desirable to decompose overall discrimination as 
the weighted sum of subpopulation discrimination levels. However, this is not a widely 
accepted criterion in the poverty field if, for example, we consider that the poverty level 
in a group cannot be independent of that in other groups. Despite this serious criticism, 
the above property is clearly very helpful in most empirical applications, since it allows 
us to measure the contribution of each population group, j, to the total level of detected 
                                                                                                                             
defined wage discrimination as the difference, in absolute terms, between the wages estimated with and 
without discrimination.   18
discrimination, (nj/n)d(xf
(j)). This means that we can study discrimination for different 
female characteristics. Thus not only can we classify women by earnings (as in the 
quantile estimations mentioned above) but also by any other variables, such as 
education level, age, or geographical location.  
 
Jenkins (1994) proposed the use of different families of aggregate discrimination 
indices. If they were conveniently defined over xf, instead of  | | f f y r −  as he initially 
proposed, the main difference of Jenkins’ approach with respect to our proposal would 
be the transfer axiom. Jenkins shows a preference for the use of indices that do not 
satisfy this axiom.
27 In fact, the family of decomposable indices that he uses in his 
empirical analysis,  α J , is a concave function that depends on the relative individual 
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where  f f f i r y r d
i i / |   | 1 − + =  is the normalised wage gap,  ( ) f f i y n y
i / = ω  is the earnings rate 
of individual i, and  0 > α , where α  is a parameter which represents the discrimination 
aversion degree of the index: the higher the parameter value, the higher the weight of 
larger wage gaps. Note that the concavity of this function guarantees that these indices 
take values between 0 and 1, which is a good property.
28 However, this property also 
means that given a constant aggregate wage gap, the more discrimination is focused on 
fewer women, the lower the discrimination level will be. It follows that evenness in the 
distribution of discrimination will increase the value of the index. This is inconsistent 
with what is generally assumed in other forms of relative deprivation like poverty, 
where increasing the level of deprivation of a more deprived person should have a larger 
impact on the aggregate level of deprivation than when the increase affects a less 
deprived person. In our view, that should be the case for discrimination too and thus we 
propose the use of indices that satisfy the transfer axiom. 
 
                                           
27 Even though he offers theoretical results for both cases depending on the sign and value of a parameter. 
28 These numbers represent, respectively, the lowest and highest discrimination level.   19
Taking into account all the above, we consider that it is not necessary to define new 
discrimination indices, as Jenkins suggests, but only to make good use of those with the 
best normative properties within the poverty literature.
29 Therefore, if we adapt the 
family indices proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) to measure [absolute] 
discrimination we can write a discrimination index such that: 
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where  k* denotes again the number of discriminated female workers and α  is the 
discrimination aversion parameter. For the special case  0 = α  the index is a head-count 
measure of the incidence of discrimination among women, for  1 = α  it accounts for the 
average level of discrimination per woman. Further, it is well known that for values of 
α  strictly higher than 1 these indices satisfy our normative requirements,  *
    d d ∈ α , 
and are additively decomposable.
30 
 
3.4 Absolute versus relative discrimination 
 
An additional issue in the measurement of discrimination is whether to use a relative 
rather than an absolute approach. In order to do this we need to define new indices, 
  α dr , which would be a function of the wage gap vector normalized with respect to 

























Another interesting possibility consists in normalizing each female wage gap 
individually by dividing it by her earnings without discrimination, 
i i i f f f r x v / = . This 
                                           
29 Zheng (1997 and 2000) offers a survey of the main poverty indices and also of the theorems which link 
those indices with poverty orderings based on deprivation profiles. 
30 It would also be interesting to measure discrimination adapting our approach to the use of different 
poverty indices that satisfy other normative properties such as those proposed by Sen (1976) or Hagenaars 
(1987). The latter would allow us to measure discrimination as the social welfare loss it causes.  
31 Another possibility would be to use the mean observed wage,  f y .   20
implies that the critical point is no longer the average wage but, instead, the highest 
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In order to guarantee that these indices satisfy the same properties as  ) (   f x dα , we need to 
redefine the discrimination curves on the normalized wage discrimination vector, 
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reformulating the dominance criterion and the theorem in a consistent way. This point 
was missed by Jenkins (1994), and implies an inconsistency in his Results 1 and 2 when 
relating them to α J and  v R  indices. Hence, the Normalised Discrimination Curve,  ) (Γ D , 
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once the vector Γ have been ranked from higher to lower relative wage discrimination: 
n Γ ≥ ≥ Γ ≥ Γ ... 2 1 . 
 
Definition of dominance in normalised discrimination. Given two normalised 
discrimination vectors, Γ
1 and Γ




2 in a discriminatory sense if 
                                           
32 The role played by 
i f r  in this kind of normalization is similar to that of the poverty line in the 
deprivation literature. Hence, by dividing the individual wage gap by 
i f r , we do something similar to 
what is done in the poverty literature when constructing relative poverty gaps by using individual poverty 
lines for each household (depending on its size, composition, location,...).   21
2 1 Γ ≠ Γ   and    ) ( ) (
2 1 Γ ≤ Γ p p D D  for any  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ p  
 
The dominance theorem for the relative case could be stated as follows: 
 
Theorem (relative case): 
For any pair of normalised discrimination distributions, Γ
1 and Γ
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being dr
*(·) the discrimination indices set which satisfies the aforementioned axioms in 
) / ( f f r x Γ [or  ) ( f v Γ ]. 
 
When comparing distributions with the same average wage, estimated without 
discrimination, the orderings derived from relative indices do not differ from those of 
the absolute case. The differences will appear when the means differ. In this case, the 
relative approach implies comparisons of individual discrimination levels given as a 




4. ESTIMATING INDIVIDUAL WAGE GAPS 
 
In order to implement the above analysis we need to estimate 
i f y  and 
i f r . We only 
know about Jenkins’ (1994) proposal based on OLS estimations of mincerian wage 
equations for men and women. Following the previous expressions [1] we can predict 
both the estimated wage of a female worker,
i f y ˆ , and her potential wage if her attributes 
were remunerated as if she was male, 
i f r ˆ : 
                                           
33  These differences are, however, crucial in the absolute case.   22
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2 ˆ f σ  is the estimated variance of uf .
34 The conditional wage gap  ) ˆ ˆ ( fi fi y r −  reflects 
the estimated wage discrimination experienced by a female worker i, being  ) ˆ ˆ ( f f y r − the 
distribution of the estimated discrimination in the female workers group.
35 
 
Alternatively we propose to estimate individual wage gaps by quantile regressions. 
When log wage equations are estimated by quantile regressions, exp( q
f fi Z β ˆ ' ) represents 
the conditional quantile q of female wage distribution yf : 
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In the latter case, 
q
fi y ˆ  could be calculated by attaching to each working woman i those 
coefficients estimated in the female quantile regression, qi
*, which minimize her 
individual residual; and 
q
fi r ˆ  would be computed for each woman i using the male wage 
structure at her quantile qi
*. In this way, what we would be actually doing for each 
woman is selecting her predicted wage, 
* ˆ
q
fi y , as the closest to her actual wage,
i f y , and 
comparing it with a male wage, 
* ˆ
q
fi r , estimated for a hypothetical man with her 
                                           
34 Exp( 2 / ˆ ˆ '
2
f f fi Z σ β + ) is the expected value of the log-normal variable, yf, conditional to Zfi in the OLS 
regression. Note that in Jenkins (1994), there is a mistake because ( 2 / ˆ
2
f σ ) was dropped out in the above 
expression. In the second equation we could substitute ( 2 / ˆ
2
f σ ) by ( 2 / ˆ 2
m σ ), and use the male variance of 
residuals. We have checked that in doing so, our empirical results would not change. 
35 We are assuming that individual women’s residual wages are unaffected by discrimination, thus the 
characteristics included in Z explain the full phenomenon. Therefore, two women with identical observed 
characteristics will present the same level of estimated discrimination. Obviously, as in Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition, any misspecification of the model drives to measurement errors in our discrimination 
level.      23
characteristics and situated in the same relative ranking within the conditional male 






5. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF SPAIN 
 
In this section, we show the advantages of our approach identifying those female 
workers who suffer the highest discrimination levels in the Spanish labor market. Thus, 
we will compare aggregate discrimination levels estimated by OLS and Quantile 
Regressions (QR) for males and females using a sample of private sector employees.
37 
The purpose here is also to explore to what extent OLS and QR results differ, not only 
because they estimate at different points of the wage distribution, but also because they 
yield different aggregate levels of discrimination. 
                                           
36 This is an ad hoc choice that might be forcing the interpretation of this type of estimates, but we 
consider that it appears most reasonable to measure individual discrimination comparing women and men 
with the same characteristics and situated at the same position in their corresponding conditional wage 
distributions. 
37 Data come from the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (Survey of Wage Structure) undertaken by the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) in 1995. This survey covers employees in firms with ten or more 
workers and does not include any wage information for employees in Agriculture, Public Administration, 
Health Services or Education. Those individuals who did not work the entire month or who worked part-
time were removed from the sample. The final number of observations for analysis are 27,085 women 
and 100,208 men. 
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Graph 4. Wage discrimination using Quantile Regressions   24
 
The variable to be explained is the logarithm of hourly wage, and explanatory variables 
are those usually included in the related literature and available in the database: tenure, 
(potential) experience, level of education, region of residence, type of contract, 
occupation (one digit National Classification of Occupations 1994), firm size, type of 
collective agreement, firm property (public or private) and the market at which most of 
the firm production is destined (international, national or local).
38 Coefficients are 
reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. Once we check that wage regressions results are 
roughly consistent with those in other previous empirical analyses, we construct wage 
distributions for working women, estimated with and without discrimination. These 
estimates are denoted respectively by f y ˆ and  f r ˆ  in the OLS case, and 
q
f y ˆ and 
q




Descriptive statistics for wages and conditional wage gaps estimated with both models 
are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. A first interesting result is that the average 
absolute wage gap (315.1 in OLS and 319.5 in QR) is 26 percent with respect to the 
observed average wage (1,188), both in OLS and QR estimations. This turns out to be 
relatively high compared to estimations on female wage discrimination for other 
developed countries in the literature.
40 
 
The non-parametric kernel wage and wage gaps densities are depicted in Figures 1a to 
2b. Observed wages result in a more accurate fit using QR, especially evident in the 
lower tail, and thus showing a greater dispersion in QR than in OLS. Furthermore, as it 
is shown in Table A2 in the Appendix, QR also presents a greater dispersion of wage 
gap density estimations in the absolute case, even if not so much in the relative case 
when each individual wage gap is normalized by  i f r ˆ and 
q
fi r ˆ .   
 
                                           
38 It was not possible, however, to control for other relevant workers’ personal characteristics such as 
marital status or the presence of children in the household. Furthermore, this database only contains 
working women and does not allow controlling for selection bias. 
39 We compute quantile regressions in ten different points of the distribution (exactly at the middle 





40 However, we should be cautious in making comparisons when studies follow different methodological 
approaches. Recent international comparisons of gender pay gaps are European Commission (2002), Blau 
and Kahn (2003), and Hernández and Méndez (2005).    25
Fig. 1.b Observed and predicted wage with 













Fig. 1.a Observed and predicted wage with 
















































In order to compare discrimination levels captured by both procedures from a normative 
and distribute point of view, absolute and normalized discrimination curves are depicted 
in Figures 3a and 3b. The figures show that OLS gender gap distribution dominates QR 
in discrimination. Thus, our second result is that, in the Spanish case, QR discrimination 
is always larger than OLS for all discrimination indices fulfilling the axioms proposed 
(in both absolute and relative cases).
41 We can check this just by looking at the bottom 
three discrimination measures reported in Table 1. This table includes also a couple of 
additional interesting indices despite the fact that they do not verify all the axioms 
                                           
41 Notice that our notion of relative discrimination is based on the ratio of the estimated discrimination to 
the individual wage without discrimination. This should be taken into account when comparing our 
results with previous evidence.   26
proposed. Most precisely, the first row reports the headcount ratio, or proportion of 
discriminated women which, using both methods, is larger than 99%, so virtually all 
females in the sample earn less than a similar male.
42 Further, the second index shows 
that the estimated amount of money one should transfer in order to remove 
discrimination using QR is also larger than using OLS. 
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Table 1. Indices of Discrimination
Absolute Normalized
OLS QR OLS QR
d α=0 0.9988 0.9962 dr α=0 0.9988 0.9962
d α=1 315.11 319.61 dr α=1 0.208 0.209
d α=2 136,000 166,000 dr α=2 0.049 0.050
d α=3 8.E+07 1.E+08 dr α=3 0.012 0.013
d α=4 7.E+10 2.E+11 dr α=4 0.003 0.004  
 
In order to deepen the distributive analysis, we divide female workers in deciles defined 
by their observed wages and calculate absolute and relative discrimination curves 
separately for each group, using the above individual wage gaps estimated over the total 
population of male and female workers. From Figures 4a and 4b, it is clear that absolute 
discrimination increases as wages grow in both OLS and QR estimations. If we drew 
the curves for relative discrimination by deciles, however, we would see that they show  
an ambiguous pattern due to the appearance of some crosses. In any case, we can assert, 
differently from the absolute case, that relative discrimination is larger at the bottom 
                                           
42 Remember that this survey does not include any Public Administration employees whose wages would 
presumably decrease discrimination in the Spanish case.   27
than at the top of the female wage distribution. This is a third finding of our analysis 
and would be consistent with the existence of a sticky floor phenomenon in the Spanish 
labor market. 
 












































































Aiming for a more explicit result on the ranking of relative discrimination by deciles, 
we propose the use of additively decomposable indices of relative discrimination. This 
strategy clearly offers less robust results but provides us with some evidence for 
intermediate deciles whose discrimination curves cross. Figures 5 displays for index 
2 = α dr , the ratio of within-group discrimination (for each decile) to average 
discrimination. A ratio value above (below) one indicates a level of discrimination 
larger (smaller) than average. Both OLS and QR estimations show very similar patterns. 
We observe that females in the first decile experience the largest relative discrimination. 
As we move along the wage distribution, discrimination decreases slightly (with the 
exception of the last decile). Similarly, when separating females by their education   28
levels, relative discrimination is much higher than average for those without studies and 
lower for those with higher studies (see Figure 6). However, in this second case the 
evolution of discrimination along the educational career decreases but without a clear 
pattern. 
 
Trying to move onwards in this analysis, we follow the strategy in De la Rica, Dolado 
and Llorens (2005) and break the sample into those females holding a university degree 
and the rest. Figures 7a and 7b present relative discrimination results by deciles for 
these two groups, here again we use the overall population average discrimination as a 
reference.
43 The results for females without university studies (the largest group) 
resemble the slightly decreasing pattern of total female workers (see Figure 5), now 
including the last decile too. In contrast, among females with a university degree, 
relative discrimination has a considerably different pattern: it surprisingly increases 
with the wage level.
44 This increase is even sharper for the last decile when using QR. 
Thus, among the more skilled women, it is the group of top-wage female earners that 
face the largest relative discrimination level. This interesting result indicates the 
existence of a glass ceiling for some female employees.
45 
 
Fig. 7a Discrimination by deciles 
non-university degree: drα=2 ratio













Fig. 7b Discrimination by deciles
university degree: dr α=2 ratio















                                           
43 Note that deciles are constructed for each sub-population. Table A3 in the Appendix shows the 
demographic weight of each group in the overall population deciles. 
44 Note, however, that its highest value is lower than that experienced by low-wage women without a 
university degree. 
45 It is relevant to emphasize that this result is not only associated with the index dr2, but it can be 
obtained with other discrimination indices due to dominance by deciles in their respective normalized 
curves.   29
Therefore, while there seems to be a sticky floor for low educated women in the Spanish 
labor market, for the highest educational group there also seems to be a glass ceiling. 
De la Rica, Dolado and Llorens (2005) obtained a similar result by decomposing the 
gender wage gap in different percentiles using quantile regressions. The advantage of 
our approach compared to theirs is that our approach allows us to quantify and compare 
both phenomena. We do this by calculating the contribution of each group’s relative 
discrimination to the whole discrimination level and present our results in Table 2. In 
the first column, we include the demographic weight of each subgroup of female 
workers,  (nj/n)*100, in the second and fifth columns we present their relative 
discrimination results, dr 2 = α (xf
(j)), and finally we detail their contribution to the whole 
discrimination level, (nj/n)*dr 2 = α (xf
(j)) (both in absolute and percentage values for OLS 
and quantile regressions). 
 
Table 2. Discrimination by education groups
OLS Quantile Regressions
Groups Population Within-group Contribution to Within-group Contribution to
discrimination overall discrimination discrimination overall discrimination
% of all women Absolute % Absolute %
Non-university degree 88.6 0.050 0.044 91.5 0.051 0.045 91.8
by decile
1 8.9 0.061 0.0054 11.2 0.067 0.0059 11.9
2 8.9 0.053 0.0047 9.7 0.053 0.0047 9.4
3 8.9 0.054 0.0047 9.8 0.050 0.0045 9.0
4 8.9 0.052 0.0046 9.6 0.051 0.0045 9.0
5 8.9 0.052 0.0046 9.5 0.051 0.0045 9.2
6 8.9 0.049 0.0043 8.9 0.047 0.0042 8.5
7 8.9 0.049 0.0044 9.0 0.050 0.0044 8.9
8 8.9 0.046 0.0041 8.5 0.048 0.0042 8.5
9 8.9 0.044 0.0039 8.1 0.049 0.0043 8.8
10 8.9 0.040 0.0036 7.3 0.048 0.0043 8.6
University degree 11.4 0.036 0.004 8.5 0.036 0.004 8.2
by decile
1 1.1 0.035 0.0004 0.8 0.031 0.0004 0.7
2 1.1 0.030 0.0003 0.7 0.028 0.0003 0.6
3 1.1 0.030 0.0003 0.7 0.027 0.0003 0.6
4 1.1 0.035 0.0004 0.8 0.031 0.0004 0.7
5 1.1 0.035 0.0004 0.8 0.033 0.0004 0.8
6 1.1 0.035 0.0004 0.8 0.033 0.0004 0.8
7 1.1 0.034 0.0004 0.8 0.035 0.0004 0.8
8 1.1 0.038 0.0004 0.9 0.039 0.0004 0.9
9 1.1 0.040 0.0005 0.9 0.041 0.0005 1.0
10 1.1 0.050 0.0006 1.2 0.061 0.0007 1.4
All women 100 0.049 0.049 100 0.050 0.050 100
j dr 2 = α
j dr 2 = α
 
 
In both cases, it can be seen that the highest educated women with the highest salaries 
bear much more relative discrimination than the highest educated women with the 
lowest salaries: 0.061 and 0.031 in quantile regressions, respectively. However, their 
contribution to overall discrimination only represents three decimal points over their 
demographic weight: 1.4 in comparison with 1.1 percent. In contrast, for female 
workers with the lowest wages and educational attainments, these percentages are 11.9 
and 8.9, respectively. This means that although the glass ceiling phenomenon has a   30
qualitative relevance, it is of a relatively small importance if we compare it with the 




In this paper we have detailed the advantages of analyzing wage discrimination from a 
distributive point of view, considering each individual discriminatory experience. We 
have exposed the limitations of using the classic approaches to the measurement of 
discrimination based on the analysis of the mean discriminatory experience and also of 
those that use some recent distributive methodologies based on quantile regressions and 
counterfactual wage distributions. Our theoretical contributions are two: First, we 
underline the imprecise measurement of discrimination using counterfactual functions. 
This is related to re-orderings as we move from the original wage distribution to a 
hypothetical non-discriminatory one. Second, and most importantly, we propose a new 
normative framework for the study of wage discrimination based on the poverty and 
deprivation literature. For the latter we provide a variety of improvements to Jenkins’ 
(1994) approach to the identification and aggregation of individual discriminatory 
experiences by adding to its consistency and normative power.  
 
The empirical application using Spanish data allows us to analyze the differences and 
similarities between OLS and quantile regressions in the measurement of aggregate 
discrimination from a distributive point of view. For this, we need to develop a new 
empirical procedure in order to estimate individual discriminatory wage gaps by 
quantile regressions. We should emphasize three basic results from this exercise. First, 
for the case of Spain, quantile regressions reveal a significantly higher level of 
aggregate discrimination compared to that detected using classical estimation 
techniques. Therefore, the choice between OLS and quantile regressions is all but 
innocuous from an aggregate point of view.  
 
Second, in spite of the previous result, OLS and QR methods raise roughly similar 
discrimination patterns throughout the wage range for the Spanish case. These results 
show that simple estimation techniques, such as OLS regressions on the mean, can 
supply good outcomes for the measurement of discrimination from a distributive point 
of view if they are complemented with normative measures.   31
 
Finally, it seems clear that absolute discrimination increases with observed wages. 
However, conclusions are not so straightforward in the relative case. On the one hand, 
women with very low wages register significantly higher relative discrimination levels 
than the rest. On the other hand, those females who hold a University degree are a 
particular case. Those who are earning the highest salaries bear relative discrimination 
levels around the total wage distribution average, but much larger than all other female 
workers holding a university degree. This is all pointing to the existence of both sticky 
floors and glass ceilings in the Spanish labor market. The former has the highest 
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 APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. OLS and Quantile regressions estimates for hourly wage in logarithms
Females Males
OLS QR at percentiles OLS QR at percentiles
5 25 45 75 95 5 25 45 75 95
Tenure 0.040 0.054 0.036 0.029 0.024 0.017 0.028 0.041 0.025 0.021 0.015 0.011
Tenure
2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Experience 0.024 0.014 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.028 0.032 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.033 0.037
Experience
2
-0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005
Primary 0.065 0.014 * 0.047 0.044 0.065 0.089 0.046 0.041 0.024 0.041 0.054 0.072
Secondary 0.275 0.185 0.225 0.236 0.282 0.353 0.234 0.182 0.181 0.220 0.254 0.324
Vocational training 0.143 0.078 0.109 0.121 0.137 0.145 0.135 0.125 0.108 0.133 0.150 0.159
Advanced voc. training 0.234 0.171 0.196 0.197 0.225 0.322 0.243 0.206 0.209 0.238 0.261 0.280
3-year college 0.380 0.241 0.310 0.357 0.414 0.443 0.379 0.302 0.332 0.361 0.382 0.430
5-year college 0.570 0.343 0.474 0.523 0.625 0.703 0.582 0.439 0.503 0.561 0.610 0.679
Indefinite contract 0.257 0.710 0.408 0.206 0.122 0.154 0.286 0.793 0.405 0.200 0.160 0.169
Managers 0.664 0.456 0.624 0.658 0.738 0.883 0.742 0.509 0.651 0.732 0.849 0.991
Professionals 0.540 0.503 0.553 0.523 0.516 0.616 0.495 0.432 0.487 0.488 0.512 0.614
Technicians 0.430 0.380 0.406 0.404 0.431 0.520 0.364 0.271 0.316 0.349 0.414 0.522
Clerks 0.219 0.250 0.228 0.206 0.210 0.257 0.191 0.184 0.168 0.183 0.208 0.267
Qualified (services) 0.149 0.184 0.172 0.144 0.112 0.111 0.063 0.095 0.070 0.058 0.049 0.122
Qualified (industry) 0.045 0.046 * 0.019 * 0.018 * 0.045 0.079 0.138 0.160 0.134 0.124 0.125 0.167
Operators 0.017 * 0.005 * -0.003 * -0.011 * 0.025 0.060 0.128 0.131 0.123 0.123 0.130 0.151
20-49 workers 0.010 * 0.012 * 0.008 * 0.019 0.022 0.041 0.063 0.059 0.046 0.056 0.085 0.092
50-99 workers 0.044 0.030 * 0.019 * 0.061 0.084 0.106 0.136 0.111 0.131 0.137 0.156 0.158
100-199 workers 0.116 0.074 0.100 0.128 0.135 0.176 0.179 0.152 0.191 0.189 0.195 0.196
> 200 workers 0.165 0.139 0.160 0.197 0.216 0.256 0.276 0.281 0.302 0.286 0.289 0.262
National labor agreement -0.072 -0.050 -0.104 -0.109 -0.105 -0.037 -0.066 -0.074 -0.087 -0.088 -0.074 -0.049
Sector or provincial agreement -0.096 -0.063 -0.103 -0.122 -0.127 -0.071 -0.067 -0.055 -0.088 -0.094 -0.086 -0.061
Public sector 0.140 0.243 0.032 * 0.076 0.210 0.144 0.027 0.167 0.061 0.049 -0.019 * -0.061
Local-regional market -0.057 -0.116 -0.066 -0.049 -0.046 -0.034 -0.016 -0.015 * -0.019 -0.006 * -0.007 * -0.007 *
National market -0.012 * -0.030 * -0.014 * 0.002 * 0.003 * 0.011 * 0.018 -0.023 0.007 * 0.017 0.030 0.060




0.59 0.45 0.35 0.37 0.43 0.43 0.62 0.46 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.44
Observations 27,085 100,208
* = coefficient is not significant at 10%. Coefficients for Regions omitted. OLS variances computed using White estimator.
Quantile regressions were performed also at percentiles 15, 35, 55, 65 and 85, not displayed for simplicity.
Market [reference: Foreign market]
Education [reference: Without studies or less than primary]
Type of contract [reference: Fixed term contract]
Type of labor agreement [reference: Firm labor agreement]
Type of Sector [reference: Private sector]
Occupation [reference: Non-qualified workers (9)]
Size of the firm [reference: 10-19 workers]
   36 
Table A2. Summary statistics: average and inequality
Average Theil (0) Theil (1) Theil (2) Gini
Wages
Observed
1,188 0.182 0.175 0.210 0.320
Predicted by OLS
1,204 0.116 0.116 0.128 0.269
1,519 0.111 0.110 0.122 0.262
Predicted by QR
1,177 0.166 0.160 0.185 0.308
1,496 0.167 0.163 0.193 0.310
Conditional Wage Gaps
Predicted by OLS
     absolute: 315.1 0.176 0.163 0.185 0.315
     relative: 0.208 0.070 0.061 0.059 0.196
Predicted by QR
     absolute: 319.5 0.276 0.248 0.312 0.383
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Note: Average values in pesetas.   37 
 
Table A3. Women with and without a university degree
Percentage by decile of observed wage (y)











Overall population 88.6 11.4  